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Casenotes
Evangelatos v. Superior Court:
Clarifying the Rule on Retroactive Intent

In 1986 California voters passed The Fair Responsibility Act (Proposition 51) 1 limiting the liability of a defendant for noneconomic
damages to an amount directly proportionate to his percentage of
fault. 2 Among the uncertainties arising after the passage of Propo-

1. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1431.2 (West Supp. 1988) (codifying Proposition 51). Proposition
51 was passed on June 3, 1986. Initiative statutes become effective the day after the election
in which they are approved. Cal. Const. art. XVIII, § 4, (West 1983). Thus, Proposition 51
took effect on June 4, 1986. Proposition 51 was passed by a vote of 62 to 38 percent. See
Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1231, 753 P.2d 585, 620, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629,
664 (1988) (Kaufman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Gene Livingston, Chairman
of the Association for California Tort Reform (ACTR) was the official proponent who filed
Proposition 51 with the California Attorney General requesting preparation of a title and
placement on the ballot. See F. HimSTAND & P. HALVoNIK, THE FAIR RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF
1986: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS APPLICATION AND CONSTITUTIONALITY 9 [hereinafter ACTR Occasional
Paper]. Mr. Hiestand is General Counsel for ACTR and prepared the Amicus Brief for ACTR
on behalf of defendants in Evangelatos.
2. Civil Code section 1431.2 states:
[T]he liability of each defendant for non-economic damages shall be several only
and shall not be joint. Each defendant shall be liable only for the amount of noneconomic damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's
percentage of fault, and a separate judgment shall be rendered against that defendant
for that amount.
CAL.. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 OVest Supp. 1988). Consequently, Proposition 51 limits the effect
of the "deep pocket rule," since plaintiffs, who could previously sue any solvent defendant
and recover full judgment, must now sue all potential defendants in order to obtain full
compensation for non-economic damages. However, Proposition 51 does not affect joint and
several liability for economic damages. Consequently, those plaintiffs who seek only economic
losses, such as medical expenses and lost wages, may still recover the full judgment from any
solvent defendant. See infra notes 18-30 and accompanying text (discussing the development
of apportionment between economic and non-economic damages).
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sition 51 are its constitutionality and applicability retroactively.3 The
resolution of these issues resulted in a split between the Court of
Appeal for the First and Second Appellate District in California. 4 In
Evangelatos v. Superior Court,- the California Supreme Court held
that Proposition 51 survived the scrutiny of vagueness 6 and equal
protection 7 challenges brought by the plaintiff.8 However, the court
limited the application of Proposition 51 to causes of action which
accrued after the passage of the statute. 9
0 occurred
The trial of Evangelatos v. Student Science Stores, Inc.1
three weeks after the passage of Proposition 51.11 The trial court and
the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District determined
that Proposition 51 was constitutional and should be applied to all
cases which had not gone to trial before.its effective date. Evangelatos resolved the conflict between the Court of Appeals in the
First and Second Appellate Districts regarding the constitutionality
and retroactivity of Proposition 51.13 Under Evangelatos, legal drafters must expressly state an intent to apply laws retroactively or no
retroactive application will be allowed.' 4
Part I of this note discusses the legal background preceding the
changes made by Proposition 51.1 Part II examines the majority and

3. Joint and Several Liability, The Tough Issues, CAL. CEB PROGRAM BOOKLET 7-8
(July/Aug 1986) [hereinafter CAL. CEB PROGRAM BOOKLET].
4. Compare Russell v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d 810, 813, 230 Cal. Rptr. 102,
103-04 (1987) (holding that Proposition 51 was not retroactive) with Evangelatos v. Superior
Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 320, 328, 234 Cal. Rptr. 344, 349 (1987) (holding Proposition 51
retroactive to all cases pending trial on its effective date), rev'd, 44 Cal.3d 1188, 753 P.2d
585, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1988).
5. 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 753 P.2d 585, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1988).
6. See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text (discussing the void for vagueness
challenges).
7. See infra notes 81-100 and accompanying text (discussing the equal protection challenge).
8. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1202-1205, 753 P.2d at 593-595, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 636639.
9. Id. at 1193, 753 P.2d at 587, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
10. See id. at 1193-94, 753 P.2d at 588, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 632 (stating that the original
action was against Student Science Stores, Inc. and Van Waters and Rogers).
11. Id. See Complaint for Damages for Personal Injury, Evangelatos v. Student Science
Stores, Inc., No. C 373 428 (Los Angeles County Sup. Ct. July 3, 1981) (on file at the Pacific
Law Journal). The cause of action accrued on or about July 7, 1980. The complaint was filed
July 3, 1981.
12. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1195-96, 753 P.2d at 588-89, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 630-31.
13. See id. at 1193-94, 753 P.2d at 587, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
14. See infra notes 114-176 and accompanying text (discussing the retroactive analysis of
the majority).
15. See infra notes 18-52 and accompanying text.
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minority opinions in Evangelatos.1 6 Part III considers the possible
17
legal ramifications of the decision.
I.
A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Joint and Several Liability Doctrine
The current comparative fault system of California is a judicially

created answer" to the harsh consequences of a contributory negligence system. 19 Generally, the contributory negligence system prevents

plaintiffs from recovering if they contributed to their harm in any
manner. 20 The contributory negligence system also requires any defendant found liable to pay full damages even if he was only

minimally negligent. 2' In Li v. Yellow Cab Co., the California
Supreme Court replaced the doctrine of contributory negligence with

the principle of comparative fault.2 2 Under comparative negligence,
the recovery of the plaintiff is diminished in direct proportion to his

degree of fault.Y
American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court 4 further refined the scope of comparative fault by permitting one tortfeasor to

obtain a right of partial equitable indemnity against other concurrent

tortfeasors. 25 Consequently, under American Motorcycle, each tort-

feasor bears liability in direct proportion to his respective degree of
fault. 26 American Motorcycle also allows defendants to join other

16. See infra notes 64-209 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 210-226 and accompanying text.
18. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 808, 532 P.2d 1226, 1229, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 861 (1975).
19. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 470 (1965) (describing when contributory negligence will bar a plaintiff's action); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWENS,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 67 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter W. KEETON] (describing the
doctrine of comparative negligence).
20. See W. KEETON, supra note 19, § 67.
21. See id., § 47 (describing plaintiff's option to take judgment against one joint tortfeasor
and dismiss the action against other joint tortfeasors).
22. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 812-13, 532 P.2d 1220, 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 864 (1975). Different forms of comparative fault are used throughout the United States.
The form adopted by California is referred to as "pure" comparative fault and compensates
an injured party for all harm attributable to the wrongdoer. See W. KEETON, supra note 19,
§ 67.
23. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 812-13, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
24. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146
Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
25. Id. at 591, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
26. Id.
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concurrent tortfeasors through the use of cross-complaints. 27 How-

all
ever, a defendant can still be held jointly and severally liable 2for
8
of the plaintiff's damages, economic as well as noneconomic.

To clarify further the problems of contribution and indemnity
among joint tortfeasors, the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. InternationalHarvester

Co.,29 determined that a settling concurrent tortfeasor has the right
of comparative indemnity against a concurrent tortfeasor not named

by the plaintiff.30 In Paradise Valley Hospital v. Schlossman, 31 the
Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District held that solvent
defendants must apportion among themselves the shortfall created

to the
by any concurrent insolvent defendants in direct proportion
32
respective degrees of culpability of the solvent defendants.
B.

Proposition 51

Although the judicially developed doctrine of comparative fault
apportioned liability in a closer degree to the direct proportion of
the defendant's fault, minimally culpable but solvent defendants,
such as local and state governments, often bore the entire obligation
to pay for a plaintiff's damages because other, more culpable defen-

dants were insolvent. 33 Initially, the Association for California Tort
27. Id. at 607, 578 P.2d at 917, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
28. Id. at 606, 578 P.2d at 917, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
29. 82 Cal. App. 3d 492, 147 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1978).
30. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 82 Cal. App. 2d at 495-96, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
31. 143 Cal. App. 3d 87, 191 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1983).
32. Paradise Valley Hosp., 143 Cal. App. 3d at 88-89, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 532-33.
33. See ACTR Amicus Brief on Behalf of Defendants, Evangelatos v. Superior Court,
No. S00194, at 33 [hereinafter ACTR Amicus Brief] (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal)
referring to the Rm. LEGIS. BUDGET COMmuTTEE, THE 1986-87 BUDGET: PERSPECTIVES AND
ISSUES (1986) (stating that from 1975 to 1985, the total civil filings for personal injury, property
damage, and death in California increased by 55 percent, while the population increased by
only 21 percent); Clemente v. State, 101 Cal. App. 3d 374, 161 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1980) (state
found liable for $3.1 million even though its estimated degree of fault was only one percent).
But cf. Comment, Rumors of Crisis: Considering the Insurance Crisis and Tort Reform in an
Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 404, 414 (citing the National Center for State Courts
press release which states that there was "no evidence to support the existence of a 'national
litigation explosion' in state trial courts"). The comment states that perception of a litigation
crisis is largely derived from federal, rather than state caseload data. Id. at 415. The comment
also asserts that reliance on this data is misplaced because federal and state caseload data
cannot be correlated. Id. at 416. According to the comment, litigation over asbestos claims
accounts for over one quarter of product liability claims and non-product liability tort cases
account for only 2.8 percent of the increase in federal tort filings. Furthermore the article
states that divorce and post-divorce proceedings account for the greatest increase in state court
dockets, not tort claims. Id.
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Reform (ACTR) sponsored legislation that attempted to reduce the

effects of the "deep pocket rule '

34

and ameliorate the allegedly

increasing costs of an "insurance crisis' '"3 by limiting the liability of
a concurrent tortfeasor to his proportionate share.3 6 These attempts

failed, however, when bills that passed the Senate were not approved
by the Assembly Judiciary Committee. 37 In response to this legislative

vacuum, ACTR wrote Proposition 51, drawing heavily from the
previously unpassed bills.3

8

The final product retained the traditional

joint and several liability doctrine for economic damages and imposed
several liability for noneconomic damages.3 9 Proposition 51, however,
did not explicitly state whether it would apply retroactively to cases
40
that accrued before its passage.
In Russell v. Superior Court,41 the Court of Appeal for the First

Appellate District held that Proposition 51 was not retroactive. 42 In
Russell, the plaintiff allegedly suffered lung disease from exposure

to asbestos products, and he sued several manufacturers of those
products .4 3 Russell's suit was awaiting trial when Proposition 51
passed. 44 Russell 45 filed a motion in limine regarding the application

of Proposition 51 to the case. 46 The trial court held Proposition 51
47
applied retroactively.
The Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District reversed,
stating that there was no clear indication of an implied intent to

apply Proposition 51 retroactively. 48 Presiding Justice Low, writing
for the court, reasoned that the use of the word "shall"

in the

Proposition indicated an intent that it apply prospectively and not
34. See Kirsch, Prop. 51 Shakes (barely) the House of Torts, Cal. Law, June 1986 at 69
(explaining the "deep pocket rule").
35. The question of whether an "insurance crisis" actually ever existed is still debated.
See generally Comment, supra note 33, at 404 (discussing the data on which the "insurance
crisis" is based).
36. See, e.g., S.B. 75, Cal. Senate, Reg. Sess. 1985-86; S.B. 575, Cal. Senate, Reg. Sess.
1983-84; S.B. 500, Cal. Senate, Reg. Sess. 1981-82.
37. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1199, 753 P.2d 585, 591, 246
Cal.Rptr. 629, 635 (1988).
38. See ACTR Amicus Brief, supra note 33, at 2.
39. See supra note 2 (text of Proposition 51).
40. See Russell v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d 810, 813, 230 Cal. Rptr. 102, 103
(1987) (finding Proposition 51 unclear on the question of retroactivity).
41. 185 Cal. App. 3d 810, 230 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1987).
42. Russell, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 813, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
43. Id. at 812, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 813, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 820, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
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retroactively. 49 He found that the passage of Propostion 51 alone

mitigated any insurance crisis by allowing for a reduction in premiums. 5 0 Furthermore, the opinion stated that retroactive application

of Proposition 51 would decrease the liability of a defendant without
a corresponding reduction of insurance premiums.5 ' The court reasoned that the California electorate would not give the insurance
52
industry such a windfall so lightly.
II.

THE CASE

In Evangelatos, the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Proposition 51, but limited its application to causes of
action which accrued after its passage. 3 The court rejected the

defendants' arguments, that there was an implied intent to make
Proposition 51 retroactive.

4 Evangelatos settles

conflicts between the

Courts of Appeal for the First and Second Appellate Districts regarding the constitutionality and retroactivity of Propostion 51.1
A.

The Facts

Gregory Evangelatos, an eighteen-year-old high school student, was
seriously injured 6 while attempting to make fireworks at home with
chemicals purchased from the Student Science Store, Inc., a retail
store.5 7 Evangelatos brought actions based on negligence and strict
49. Id. at 819, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
50. Id. at 820, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1193, 753 P.2d 585, 587, 246 Cal.Rptr.
629, 631 (1988).
54. See infra notes 127-177 and accompanying text (discussing defendants arguments in
favor of a retroactive application of Proposition 51).
55. Compare Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 320, 234 Cal. Rptr. 344
(1982) (holding that Proposition 51 is retroactive), rev'd, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 753 P.2d 585, 246
Cal. Rptr. 629 (1988) with Russell v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d 810, 813, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 102, 103 (1987) (holding that Proposition 51 is not retroactive).
56. Evangelatos lost all of his left thumb, parts of three fingers on his left hand, part of
his right thumb, part of his right index finger, all vision in his right eye, and all but light/
dark differentiation in his left eye. See Petition for Appropriate Peremptory/Alternative
Extraordinary Writ Relief; Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Evangelatos v. Superior
Court, No. C 373 428, at 7 (Los Angeles County Sup. Ct. 1988) (copy on file at Pacific Law
Journal) [hereinafter Petition].
57. Petition, supra note 56, at 7-8. Specifically, Mr. Evangelatos brought a pestle in
contact with a mortar containing aluminum flake powder, sulfer, and sodium chlorate.
Instantaneous detonation occurred. Id.
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liability theories against the retailer, wholesaler, and four manufacturers.5 8 The case was assigned for trial June 23, 1986, almost three
weeks after Proposition 51 became law.5 9 Counsel for both sides filed
motions with the trial court questioning whether Proposition 51
applied to this caseA° The trial court ruled that Proposition 51 should
be applied to all cases which had not yet gone to trial. 61 The Court
of Appeal for the Second Appellate District affirmed, 62 thus creating
a conflict with the First Appellate District decision in Russell.63
B.

The Majority Opinion

In an opinion by Associate Justice Arguelles, the California Supreme Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of Proposition
51, 64 but divided four to three in reversing the Court of Appeals on
the issue of retroactivity by finding that Proposition 51 applied
prospectively only. 65 On the issue of constitutionality, the court held
that Proposition 51 was not unconstitutional on either a void for

58. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1195, 753 -P.2d 585, 588, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 632 (1988). The court granted three of the manufacturers summary judgment
because chemicals which were originally packaged with warning labels had been repackaged
and relabeled by the retailer, a practice over which the manufacturer had no control. The
plaintiff dismissed the action against the fourth manufacturer. Id.
59. Id. at 1195, 753 P.2d at 588, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 320, 234 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1987).
Prior to the Supreme Court's receipt of the petition for review, Russell held that Proposition
51 was inapplicable to all causes of action which accrued prior to its effective date. Russell v.
Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d 810, 813, 230 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1988). Evangelatos was
remanded to the Court of Appeal to reexamine it in light of Russell. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d
at 1195, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 632, 753 P.2d at 588. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal upheld the
trial court's determination that the Act was intended to apply to all cases which had not been
tried by the time of its effective date. Evangelatos, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 327, 234 Cal. Rptr.
at 344, rev'd, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 753 P.2d 585, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629. The appellate court rejected
the reasoning in Russell for three reasons. First, the court found that to deny the Act's
retroactivity frustrated electoral intent by delaying the effectiveness of the decision of the
electorate by several years. Second, the court found the Russell court's interpretation of the
word "shall" in the Proposition as connoting future activity was misplaced. Third, the court
found that the Russell analysis of an insurance industry windfall was inaccurate, noting that
since insurance premiums are regulated by the free market insurance companies' losses must
affect their future rates so that they can turn a profit. Id. at 327, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
63. Russell, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 813, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 103-04.
64. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1193, 753 P.2d 585, 587, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 631. In contrast, the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District did not
discuss the constitutionality of.Proposition 51. Russell, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 810, 230 Cal.
Rptr. at 102.
65. See infra notes 71-177 and accompanying text (describing the reasoning of the court
on the issues of constitutionality and retroactivity).
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vagueness challenge 66 or under a rational basis equal protection
analysis.6 7 The court parted company on the issue of retroactivity,

dividing four to three on whether Proposition 51 was applicable to
causes of action which accrued before the passage of the Act.6 The

majority rejected the five arguments made by defendant for retroactive application of the statute, finding the statute lacked the manifestation of intent necessary to render its application retroactive.6 9
1.

Constitutional Challenge

The court unanimously held that Proposition 51 did not violate
either the vagueness doctrine or equal protection clause.70 The plaintiff cataloged a number of questions alleged to be instances of

ambiguity and uncertainty in Proposition 5 17' and asserted that the
sheer number of questions illustrated the necessity of weighing them

66. See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text (discussing the void for vagueness
challenge). See also Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) (giving the definition
of a statute that is void for vagueness as that which is so unclearly defined that persons "of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.").
67. See infra notes 71-100 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional challenges).
68. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1189, 753 P.2d at 585, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
69. See infra notes 127-177 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for rejecting a
retroactive application of Proposition 51).
70. See infra notes 71-100 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutionality of
Proposition 51). Although Justices Kaufman, Eagleson and Anderson dissented from the
majority opinion on the issue of retroactivity, they concurred in the judgment that Proposition
51 is constitutional. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1193, 753 P.2d at 587, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
71. Plaintiff's questions were as follows:
1. Does Prop. 51 apply retroactively?: to existing lawsuits or causes of action?; is
it effective as of date cause of action arose, or date suit filed, or date of trial?;
what about retrials on other grounds? 2. What cases are affected by Prop. 51?:
actions in which defendants are liable without fault, e.g. strict products liability?;
or on an intentional tort theory?; actions in which plaintiff is faultless?; actions
against only a single defendant because plaintiff has settled with other wrongdoers
before filing suit? 3. What damages are covered by Prop. 51?: is there a new
standard of proof ("objectively verifiable, monetary") for economic losses?; is it
applicable to future losses (earning capacity, future medical expenses, etc.)? 4. Whose
fault is considered?: defendants who have already settled?; cross-defendants?; employer-employee?; tortfeasors immune from suit (e.g. employers covered by workers
comp., governmental tortfeasors)?; tortfeasors not subject to jurisdiction? 5. How
is fault determined?: fault of tortfeasors not before the court? (must prove they
were not the major wrongdoers?); at good faith settlement hearings?; at trial?; new
jury instructions required?; new special verdict forms required? 6. "Mary Carter"
Agreements Effect?
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Objections in Opposition to
Defendant's Proffered Jury Instructions and Special Verdict Forms, Evangelatos v. Superior
Court, No. C 373 428, at 44-45 [hereinafter Plaintiff's Objections] (copy on file at Pacific
Law Journal).
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against the principles of the vagueness doctrine. 72 Additionally, the
plaintiff asserted that Proposition 51 confuses the public and leaves
judges and jurors to decide cases without any standards to guide
73
them.
The court refuted this contention in holding that as long as the
statute does not infringe upon a constitutional right, a challenger of

Proposition 51 must show impermissible vagueness in all, not merely
some, of its applications. 74 The court held that Proposition 51 was
not vague in all its applications. 75 For example, application of Proposition 51 to cases accruing after June 4, 1986, and application of
the statute to a multiple tortfeasor case in which all defendants are
solvent and joined is not vague. 76 Finally, the court analogized the
factual situation to that presented in American Bank & Trust Co. v.

Community Hospital.7 7 In American Bank, the plaintiff challenged
the validity of California Code of Civil Procedure section 667.7 on
vagueness grounds. 78 The court in American Bank stated that the
ambiguities raised by plaintiff were not insurmountable and that any
uncertainties could be addressed by allowing the courts to fill gaps
in the statutory scheme on a case-by-case basis. 79 In applying the
reasoning of American Bank, the court in Evangelatos stated that

the same reasoning applied to Proposition 51 and found no merit in
the claim of unconstitutional vagueness. 80

72. Id. at 45.
73. Id. at 47. "Civil as well as criminal statutes must be sufficiently clear as to give a
fair warning of the conduct prohibited, and they must provide a standard or guide against
which conduct can be uniformly judged by courts and administrative agencies." Morrison v.
State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 231, 461 P.2d 375, 387, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175, 187 (1969)
(male teacher who engaged in limited noncriminal homosexual relations with a fellow male
teacher was not subject to disciplinary action under a state statute authorizing revocation of
teaching credentials unless teacher's actions indicated unfitness to teach).
74. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1201, 753 P.2d 585, 592-93, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 635-36. The court stated that most statutes are ambiguous in some respects. Id.
Justice Arguelles pointed out that the statute can be applied quite clearly in a number of
situations including cases accruing after its effective date. Id. at 1202, 753 P.2d at 593, 246
Cal. Rptr. at 637.
75. Id. at 1202, 753 P.2d at 593, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1201-02, 753 P.2d at 593, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 636-37 (referring to American Bank
& Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984))
(holding MICRA constitutional under a void for vagueness challenge).
78. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d at 364, 683 P.2d 670,
672, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 673. Plaintiff challenged section 667 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure, part of the Medical Injury Reform Compensation Act (MICRA) on the ground
that a provision mandating periodic payments raised questions of how a trial court is to
formulate a payment plan in the absence of detailed special jury verdicts. Id.
79. Id. at 378, 683 P.2d at 682, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
80. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1202, 753 P.2d 585, 593, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 637 (1988).
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Next, the decision discussed the plaintiff's two theories that Proposition 51 violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the state and
federal constitutions. 81 Under the first theory, the plaintiff urged that
Proposition 51 irrationally discriminated between those plaintiffs who
suffered economic losses and those who sought recovery of noneconomic losses.8 2 Under the second theory, plaintiff contended that
Proposition 51 created an irrational distinction between plaintiffs
83
injured by solvent versus insolvent tortfeasors. Specifically, the
plaintiff asserted that those who suffered economic losses received
84
greater protection than those who suffered non-economic losses.
The court responded to this argument by analogizing the Evangelatos
85
facts to those of Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, which held
that discrimination in the form of limitations on recovery of nona violation of equal protection even under
economic damages was not
86
analysis.
basis
rational
a

81. CAL. CONST. art.I, §§ 11, 21. Article I, sections 11 and 21 of the California Constitution
guarantee to every person that "[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation"
and that "[no] citizen, or class of citizens, [shall] be granted privileges or immunities which,
upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens". Id. The Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CO NST. amend. XIV, § 1.
82. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1203, 753 P.2d at 594, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 637. The United
States Supreme Court has employed three levels of scrutiny with regard to upholding legislation
under the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. Strict scrutiny is applied to any
statute that is based on a suspect classification or which impairs a fundamental right. See
generally Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (demonstrating that legislation that discriminated in jury selection against Mexican-Americans was subject to strict scrutiny because
the classification effectively disfavored them as a group); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding that a poll tax violated the equal protection clause by depriving
citizens of the fundamental right of voting; a right the court stated was preservative of all
other rights). This kind of legislation will be upheld only where necessary to promote a
compelling government interest. Harper, 383 U.S. at 667. The other recognized level of
constitutional review of equal protection challenges is the "rational relation" review. See, e.g.,
United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (upholding a modification of
railroad retirement benefits despite the lack of articulation of legislative purpose, by finding
as long as there was some rational reason for Congress to make the classification it became
constitutionally irrelevant whether Congress actually did base the legislation on that particular
reason). Finally, the Supreme Court has utilized a third level of review which has not been
openly acknowledged. This mid-level scrutiny is formulated by the test articulated by the Court
in Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 20, (1982) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412 (1920)) (stating that the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike). The standard
set forth in Toll and F.S. Royster is still the standard used today.
83. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1204, 753 P.2d 585, 594, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 638. See also infra notes 84-93 and accompanying text (discussing discrimination
between plaintiffs suffering economic and non-economic damages).
84. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1204, 753 P.2d at 594, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
85. 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985).
86. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 162, 695 P.2d at 683, 211 Cal.. Rptr. at 385.
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In Fein, plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the Medical

Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) which was intended to
respond to what the legislature called "an insurance crisis" in the

medical malpractice area by placing a cap of $250,000 on the recovery
of noneconomic damages. 8 7 Because limiting recovery of noneconomic damages alone was considered a cost-effective means of alle-

viating the crisis, the Fein court held MICRA to be rationally related 8

to the goal of alleviating the insurance crisis, and therefore, not a
violation of equal protection provisions. 9 Furthermore, the Justices
in Fein stated that they knew of no case law that immunized the

recovery of noneconomic damages from legislative limitation or revision. 90 Relying on this statement, the Evangelatos court held that
although Proposition 51 imposed a classification which may give an

advantage of greater recovery to persons suffering economic loss,
the drafters of the Proposition were not required to take away that
advantage in order to acheive equal protection for both classes. 9' The
court stated that since the distinction drawn by Proposition 51

between economic and non-economic damages was less severe than
the limitation imposed by MICRA, it also did not violate the equal

protection clauses. 92 The court pointed out that Proposition 51 placed
no limitation on the amount of non-economic damages recoverable
but only a limitation on the proportion of those damages to be paid
by a particular defendant.93
Second, the plaintiff contended that the Act impermissibly discrim-

inated within the class of plaintiffs who suffer noneconomic damages
by granting a full recovery only to those persons injured by solvent

87. Id. at 160, 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383. See also CAL. CIrV. CODE § 3333.2
(West Supp. 1988) (providing the text of MICRA).
88. The plaintiff argued that in order to survive a constitutional challenge that a statute
violates equal protection, the court must apply mid-level scrutiny. The plaintiff did not specify
why this level of scrutiny was chosen as applicable in this case. See Plaintiff's Objections,
supra note 71, at 56 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971)) (equal protection
clause denies the states the power to enact laws that treat persons differently and divide persons
into different classes based on criteria wholly unrelated to objectives of the statute); Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (holding that classifications made by state
legislatures must be reasonable). The majority, however, applied a rational relation test to
Proposition 51. See Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1203-04, 753 P.2d 585,
594-95, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637-38 (1988).
89. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 160, 695 P.2d 665, 680, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 368, 383 (1985) (holding MICRA constitutional under an equal protection challenge).
90. Id. at 159-60, 695 P.2d at 681, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
91. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1203, 753 P.2d at 594, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
92. Id. at 1203, 753 P.2d at 594, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
93. Id. at 1203-04, 753 P.2d at 594, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
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tortfeasors. 94 The court rejected this contention. 95 Unless the drafters
of Proposition 51 intended to discriminate between those suffering
non-economic injuries by solvent as opposed to insolvent tortfeasors
the classification would not be impermissible. 96 The court stated that
Proposition 51 intended to limit the liability of each defendant for
non-economic damages to his proportion of fault. 97 Consequently, a
distinction between this catagory of plaintiffs alone was not enough
to render Proposition 51 unconstitutional. 98 The court allowed the
use of legislation to limit non-economic damage liability finding it
entirely appropriate, thus reinforcing its decisions in the MICRA
cases of Fein99 and American Bank.?°
2.

The Retroactivity Challenge

The second major assertion involved the reliance interest of parties
to the litigation in then-existing rules of joint and several liability.10'
The plaintiff contended that this reliance interest would be unfairly
defeated by a retroactive application of the Proposition. 02 The court
agreed, noting that before the enactment of Proposition 51, several
plaintiffs and defendants relied on the existing joint and several
liability rules in deciding which parties to join and in rejecting or
accepting settlement offers.10 The defendants asserted that the nature
and purposes of Proposition 51 necessitated a retroactive application.' °4 The court held the statute prospective in application.I °- First,
the court dispensed with the argument that the issue of retroactivity
was not raised by the factual situation because application of Proposition 51 to cases tried after the effective date of Proposition 51
was prospective application. 0 6 Justice Arguelles emphasized that ap94. Id. at 1204, 753 P.2d at 594, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr.
368 (1985).
100. American Bank & Trust v. Community Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204
Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984).
101. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1205, 753 P.2d 585, 595, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 639 (1988).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1227, 753 P.2d at 611, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 655.
106. Id. at 1205-06, 753 P.2d at 595-96, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 639-40.
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plication of a tort reform statute to a cause of action which arose
before the effective date of the statute but tried after the effective
date of the statute constitutes a retroactive application of the statute. 10 7 Second, the court found the general rule of statutory construction cases dictate that a presumption of prospectivity exists.'10 Finally,
the court rejected five assertions made by the defendant that an
implied intent for retroactive application must be found. °9
a. Prospective or Retroactive Application
Amici for defendants had asserted that the application of Proposition 51 to Evangelatos would be prospective, thus retroactivity was
not involved." 0 They reasoned that since the case had not yet gone
to trial, no retroactive application of the statute was involved."' The
2
California Supreme Court found this contention to be meritless."
The court restated the definition of a retroactive law as one affecting
rights, obligations, acts, transactions and conditions performed or
existing before the effective date of the statute." 3 The court further
emphasized that both the United States Supreme Court and other
state courts follow the rule enunciated in Winfree v. Northern Pacific
Railway Co.114 In Winfree, the Court held that applying a tort reform
statute to a case tried after the effective date of the statute constitutes
retroactive application of the statute.'
b.

Rule of Statutory Interpretation

In deciding whether Proposition 51 applied retroactively the court
relied upon the general principles of statutory construction and upon

107. Id. at 1206, 753 P.2d at 596, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 639-40.
108. Id. at 1206-09, 753 P.2d at 596-98, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 640-42.
109. See infra notes 127-177 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning for rejecting
a retroactive application of Proposition 51).
110. Evangelatos v. Superior Court 1188, 1205-06, 753 P.2d 585, 595-96, 246 Cal. Rptr.
629, 639-40 (1988).

111.

Id.

112. Id.
113. This definition of retroactivity was explained in great detail in Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 30 Cal. 2d 388, 391, 182 P.2d 159, 159-60 (1947). Aetna
held that legislative intent to apply a statute retroactively cannot be implied from the fact the
statute is remedial and subject to liberal construction. Id.
114. 227 U.S. 296 (1913).
115. Winfree, 227 U.S. at 301.
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section three of the California Civil Code." 6 According to the majority, statutes are generally construed prospectively, unless the legislation clearly manifests an intent to the contrary." 7 California Civil

Code section three reinforces this presumption by declaring that all
statutes in the Code are to be construed prospectively unless there is

an express intent to the contrary. 1 8

The majority acknowledged the cases cited by the dissent" 9 in
which the principle of statutory construction transcended the general

rule of prospectivity120 These cases held that the intent of the
legislature was controlling. Consequently, a presumption of prospec-

tivity applied only after a finding that the legislative intent was
impossible to determine.' 2 ' However, the majority stated that the
language relied upon by the dissent' 22 did not indicate that California
had opted for an application of the prospectivity principle that was
unique and distinct from the United States Supreme Court and that

of other states. 2 Rather, Justice Arguelles emphasized that in cases
decided subsequent to those relied upon by the dissenters, 2 4 the

116. Civil Code section 3, states that [s]tatutes will be construed as operating prospectively
unless an intention that they shall have retrospective effect is clearly expressed. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3 (West 1983).
117. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1207, 753 P.2d 585, 596, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 640 (1988).
118. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3 (West 1983).
119. The cases cited by the dissent were Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 587, 546
P.2d 1371, 1373, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 429 (1976) (listing factors to consider in the determining
whether a statute should be retroactively applied); Mannheim v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d
678, 686-87, 478 P.2d 17, 21, 91 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (1970) (stating that the presumption of
prospectivity is subordinated to the canon that statutes are construed to effectuate legislative
intent); In re Estrada, 63 Cal. 2d 740, 746, 408 P.2d 948, 951-52, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172, 175.76
(1965) (stating the presumption of. retroactivity should be applied only after it is determined
impossible to ascertain legislative intent).
120. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1208-09, 753 P.2d at 597-98, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 641-42.
121. See Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1208, 753 P.2d at 597, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
122. The language to which the majority referred is that stating that the presumption of
prospectivity must be subordinated to "the transcendent canon of statutory construction that
the design of the legislature be given effect ... [and] is to be applied only after, considering
all pertinent factors, it is determined that it is impossible to ascertain the legislative intent."
Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1208, 753 P.2d at 597, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 641 (quoting Marriage of
Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976) and Mannheim v. Superior
Court, 3 Cal. 3d 678, 478 P.2d 17, 91 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1970)).
123. Id. at 1208, 753 P.2d at 597-98, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 641 (referring to the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982)).
124. Id. at 1208, 753 P.2d at 598, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 641-42; refers to Hoffman v. Board
of Retirement, 42 Cal. 3d 590, 593, 724 P.2d 511, 513, 229 Cal. Rptr. 825, 827 (1986)
(pronouncing the general rule that statutes affecting an employee's substantive rights are
construed prospectively unless the legislature clearly expresses an intent to the contrary); Fox
v. Alexis, 38 Cal. 3d 621, 637, 699 P.2d 309, 314, 214 Cal. Rptr. 132, 137 (1985) (stating the
factors to be applied to ascertain a legislative intent for retroactivity); White v. Western Title
Ins. Co., 40 Cal. 3d 870, 884, 710 P.2d 309, 316, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509, 516 (1985) (unless a
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presumption of prospectivity in statutory interpretation has been

followed.

z5

As a result, the majority finding no expression of ret-

roactive intent, applied the prospectivity presumption.
c.

26

Retroactive Application

The majority of the court acknowledged that even when a statute
does not contain an express provision requiring a retroactive application, one can be implied if the legislative history or context of the
act provides a sufficiently clear indication of an intent to make it
retroactive. 2 7 The defendants made five arguments that the requisite
implied intent to make Proposition 51 retroactive existed.1'1 Rejecting
each of these arguments, a majority of the court held that, in the
absence of an objective manifestation of intent to apply Proposition
29
51 retroactively, none could be inferred.
The defendant's first contention involved inferring an intent to
make Proposition 51 retroactive by considering factors enunciated in
the case of Marriageof Bouquet.3 0 These factors included the context
of the enactment, the ends sought to be achieved, the evils sought
to be remedied, and the history of the times and legislation on the

statute makes a retroactive application clear, it will not be construed to have retroactive effect);
Baker v. Sudo, 194 Cal. App. 3d 936, 943, 240 Cal. Rptr. 38, 43 (1987) (statutory amendment
broadened rather than merely clarified civil liability for providing intoxicating liquors to minors
and therefore was not subject to retroactive application); Sagadin v. Ripper, 175 Cal. App.
3d 1141, 1156, 221 Cal. Rptr. 675, 683 (1985) (legislation eliminating liability of social hosts
could not be applied retroactively to immunize social hosts found liable for a pre-legislation
accident); Glavinich v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. 163 Cal. App. 3d 263, 272, 209
Cal. Rptr. 266, 271 (1984) (statutes are not to be applied retroactively unless express language
or clear and unavoidable implication negates the presumption).
125. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1208-09, 753 P.2d at 598, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 641-42.
126. Id. at 1209, 753 P.2d at 598, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
127. Id. at 1210, 753 P.2d at 599, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 642-43.
128. Defendants argued the following: (1) Proposition 51 must be applied retroactively
when considering it in light of factors announced in Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583,
587, 546 P.2d 1371, 1373, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 429 (1976); (2) the electorate intended Proposition
51 to apply retroactively; (3) a prospective operation of Proposition 51 would fail to accomplish
the primary intent of Proposition 51; and (4) Proposition 51 should be applied retroactively
by analogy to the retroactive application of Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d
1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) and American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.
3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal.Rptr. 182 (1978). Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1209-27, 753 P.2d
at 598-610, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 642-54.
129. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1209, 753 P.2d at 598, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 642 "[v]e find
nothing in the language of Proposition 51 which expressly indicates that the statute is to apply
retroactively ....
[T]he absence of any express provision directing retroactive application
strongly supports prospective operation of the measure." Id.
130. Id. at 1210, 753 P.2d at 599, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 641; Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal.
3d 583, 587, 546 P.2d 1371, 1373, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 429 (1976).
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same subject.' 3 ' The statute at issue in Bouquet was accompanied by
a resolution indicating a specific discussion of retroactivity during

the debate on the measure which illustrated that it was intended to
apply retroactively.

32

In contrast, the court in Evangelatos found

that the findings and declaration of purpose for Proposition 51 did

not indicate any conscious consideration of retroactivity. 3 3 The defendants also had failed to offer any comparable evidence of retro-

active intent. 34 The court stressed that, in considering the history of
the times and legislation on the same subject, the drafters either

knew or should have known that Proposition 51 would not be applied
retroactively. 135
Second, the defendants contended that Proposition 51 should be

applied retroactively regardless of the drafter's intent since electoral

intent controls a proposition. 3 6 The court acknowledged that the

intent of the electorate would prevail if it conflicted with the intent
of the drafters.

37

However, the court found no basis from which to

determine electoral intent.138 The majority implied that the lack of
an express provision for retroactive intent indicated that, in all
probability, uninformed members of the public did not consider the
issue at all. 139 Futhermore, the court surmised that informed members

of the public who actually considered the issue probably assumed
the general presumption of prospectivity applied. 140 Additionally, the
majority explained that the remedial nature of the Proposition as

indicated by the Findings and Declaration of Purpose,

41

was not

necessarily indicative of an intent to apply the statute retroactively.

42

131. Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d at 587, 546 P.2d at 1373, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
132. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1211, 753 P.2d 585, 599-600, 246
Cal. Rptr. 629, 643 (1988). See Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 590, 546 P.2d 1371,
1375, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 430-31 (1976).
133. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1211, 753 P.2d at 599-600, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1211-12, 753 P.2d at 600, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 644. Because ACTR was the
principal drafter and proponent of Proposition 51 and was also involved in post-MICRA
litigation involving the retroactivity of MICRA, the court held that it must have chosen not
to insert a provision for Proposition 51's retroactive application perhaps in order to avoid the
political consequences of including a retroactive provision. Id.
136. Id. at 1212, 753 P.2d at 600-01, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
137. Id. at 1212, 753 P.2d at 601, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1212-13, 753 P.2d at 601, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 644-45.
140. Id.
141. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.1 (West Supp. 1988). The findings and declaration of
purpose section indicates that the measure was an attempt to create a fairer system than that
of the preexisting joint and several liability doctrine by holding defendants liable in direct
proportion to their degree of fault. Id.
142. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1213, 753 P.2d 585, 601, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 645 (1988).

382
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The majority indicated that if voters had considered the retroactive
4
application of Proposition 51, they might have opposed it.1 1

Third, the defendants argued that a prospective operation of
Proposition 51 would fail to assuage the effects of the insurance
crisis, which was the primary intention of Proposition 51.144 The
court held that prospective application of Proposition 51 would not
cause delay of insurance premium reductions that the statute intended
to facilitate. 45 Defendants contended that there would be a failure
to effectuate relief from the insurance crisis because several years
would pass before a cause of action accruing after the effective date
of the Proposition came to trial. 146 The defendant alleged that the
147
electorate could not have intended this kind of result.
The court found three major flaws in this argument.148 First, the
court stated that insurance companies calculate premiums based on
potential damages a defendant may have incurred during the entire

143. Id. at 1215-18, 753 P.2d at 603-05, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 646-48. In the court's hypothetical
situation, grounds for opposition to retroactivity would stem from reliance on the preexisting
joint and several liability rule by litigants who would be put in a worse position than litigants
under the modification accomplished by the Proposition. Id. For example, a plaintiff whose
causes of action arose before the enactment of Proposition 51 may not have sued all parties
responsible for his non-economic injuries because of increased expenses in litigation. Id. at
1213-14, 753 P.2d at 603, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 645. This strategy would have been based on the
previous rule that defendants could bring in additional tortfeasors by means of cross-complaints.
Id. at 1215, 753 P.2d at 603, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 646-47. If Proposition 51 were applied to
those plaintiffs, many would not be able to recover full non-economic damages because the
statute of limitations would have expired as to those unjoined additional tortfeasors. Id.
Finally, the court pointed out that retroactive application of the Act would disturb settled
expectations of parties who entered settlement agreements in reliance on the previous joint
and several liability doctrine. Id. at 1216, 753 P.2d at 603, 246 Cai. Rptr. at 647. For example,
plaintiffs may have settled with some defendants for a sum less than they otherwise would
have if they knew that defendants would be held only severally liable for non-economic harm.
Likewise, defendants may have settled with a plaintiff for a sum greater than they otherwise
would have paid under Proposition 51 in reliance on the right to obtain equitable indemnity
from concurrent tortfeasors. Id. If a defendant would sue concurrent tortfeasors for indemnity
when insolvent defendants were also present, the suing defendant would obtain only the sued,
solvent defendant's proportionate share determined by his percentage of fault and not necessarily the equitable indemnity previously allowed. See CAL. Cwy. CODE § 1431.2 (West Supp.
1988). The suing defendant would have paid an amount greater than his proportion of fault
in reliance on a doctrine which previously allowed him to apportion the shortfall created by
the insolvent tortfeasors among those he sued for indemnity. See Paradise Valley Hosp. v.
Schlossman, 143 Cal. App. 3d 87, 93, 191 Cal. Rptr. 531, 536 (1983). By comparing the unfair
and unexpected consequences that could result from retroactive application of the Proposition
against the delay of providing the benefits of it to defendants, the court indicated the more
fair approach was a prospective application of Proposition 51 which would protect all parties'
reliance interests. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1217, 753 P.2d at 604, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 648.
144. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1218, 753 P.2d at 605, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
145. Id. at 1218-21, 753 P.2d at 605-07, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 649-51.
146. Id. at 1218, 753 P.2d at 605, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1218-19, 753 P.2d at 605, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
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time period for which the insurance policy is in force. 149 Thus, any

damages awarded for actions accruing after June 3, 1986 should
cause an immediate reduction in premiums, thereby affording immediate benefits to potential defendants.

50

Second, the court found

that a retroactive application of Proposition 51 might result in a
windfall for insurance companies that collected pre-Proposition 51
insurance premiums based on rates calculated under the previous
joint and several liability rule.'5' As support for this assertion, the
court pointed out that Proposition 51 did not contain a provision
requiring insurers to return any portion of previously collected premiums to their insured.152 Third, the court stated that the prospective
application of Proposition 51 would not create the delay in alleviating
the insurance crisis predicted by the defendants. 51 3 The court predicted

that the benefits of Proposition 51 would be felt much earlier than
the trial waiting period which, in Evangelatos, was approximately six

years. 5 4 The prediction was based on the fact that almost all cases
are resolved by settlement for an amount reflecting the potential
liability of a defendant at trial. 55 The majority added that alleviation

of an insurance crisis, standing alone, was not sufficient evidence of
an intent to apply a statute retroactively.

56

The court examined

measures similar to Proposition 51 that consciously focused on the
issue of retroactivity in other jurisdictions. 57 Justice Arguelles wrote
that each of these measures differed as to whether and to what extent
each statute should apply to a preexisting cause of action.' In light
of this examination, the court concluded that a prospective applica-

149.
150.

Id.
Id.

151. Id. at 1219, 753 P.2d at 605, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 649. In fact, the court noted that the
potential windfall to insurance companies resulting from the Act's retroactive application may
have been one of the reasons the drafters chose to exclude the issue of retroactivity since it
may have made the measure less attractive to the electorate. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1219, 753 P.2d 605-06, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
154. Id. Gregory Evangelatos was injured in July 1980. His case was assigned for trial
June 23, 1986, nearly six years from the date of injury and almost five years after the action
was filed. Id. at 1195, 753 P.2d at 588, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
155. Id. at 1219, 753 P.2d at 605-06, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
156. Id. at 1219-20, 753 P.2d at 605-06, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 649-50.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1220, 753 P.2d at 606, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 650. For example, the court found
the statutes of Florida, Missouri, and Nevada were explicitly made applicable only to causes
of action accruing after the date of the enactment. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.71(2) (West
Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.235 (Vernon Supp. 1988); NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.141 2
(1987).
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tion must control since Proposition 51 was silent as to the question
of retroactivity. 5 9
Fourth, defendants argued that Proposition 51 should be analogized to the retroactive application of Li v. Yellow Cab Co. 60 and
American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court '61and applied
retroactively. 62 The court flatly rejected this contention quoting the
well established rule announced by Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist regarding the operation of a statute.1 63 That rule stated, what
Justice Rehnquist called "a principle familiar to every law student,"
that statutes operate prospectively only while judicial decisions operate retrospectively. 64 Li and American Motorcycle were judicial
rather than statutory enactments. 65 The Evangelatos majority emphasized that the judiciary was the appropriate body to determine
the retroactivity of the changes in Li and American Motorcycle since
the court made the policy decision to change the common law rules
at issue in those cases.' 66 However, the court felt bound by Civil
Code section three and the rules of statutory construction to apply
Proposition 51 prospectively because it was silent on the retroactivity
67
question. 1
The defendants' final argument involved an analogy to what the
defendants termed "a line of cases.' ' 68 This line of cases applied

159. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1220, 753 P.2d 585, 605-06, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 649-50 (1988). The court supported this conclusion with the decision in the MICRA
case of Bolen v. Woo, 96 Cal. App. 3d 944, 158 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1979). In Bolen, the question
raised was whether one of the MICRA provisions should apply retroactively to a case which
accrued before MICRA's enactment but tried after its effective date. Id. at 959, 158 Cal.
Rptr. at 462-63. The Bolen court rejected defendant's contention that the skyrocketing costs
of medical malpractice insurance mandated a retroactive application of MICRA, emphasizing
that the legislature could have inserted a retroactive provision if it had intended one to be
applicable. Id.
160. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
161. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
162. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1221, 753 P.2d at 607, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
163. Id. at 1207, 753 P.2d at 596, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 640 (quoting United States v. Security
Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79-80 (1982)).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1221, 753 P.2d at 607, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
166. Id. at 1222, 753 P.2d at 607, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1222-25, 753 P.2d at 608-10, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 651-54. The line of cases to
which defendant referred included: Tulley v. Tranor, 53 Cal. 274 (1878) (involving former
Civil Code section 3336 which had allowed a plaintiff to choose his measure of damages in
wrongful conversion cases until it was amended to provide plaintiffs with only one measure
of damages; since Tulley's action accrued before the amendment of the statute, the statute
was construed as requiring retroactive application); Feckenscher v. Gamble, 12 Cal. 2d 482,
85 P.2d 885 (1938) (original Civil Code section 3343 allowed a defrauded plaintiff to collect
the difference between the defendant's representation as to the value of the property plaintiff
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statutory amendements modifying the measure of damages in wrongful conversion cases to all trials conducted after the effective dates
of the statutes.1 69 In rejecting the analogy drawn by defendants, the
court noted that cases cited by the defendants did not establish a
broad rule mandating that any change in recovery of damages must
be applied retroactively.170 The court referred to its decision in White
v. Western Title Insurance Co.,171 as illustrating the inaccuracy of
inferring that the presumption of prospectivity is not applicable to
statutes modifying damages.172 The court conceded that the line of
cases cited by defendant provided support for the legislative alteration
of the measure of damages to pre-existing causes of action.'7 However, the court concluded that the same cases do not reject the
ordinary presumption of prospective application1 74 The majority
acknowledged that plaintiffs may still obtain a full recovery of
damages by joining all responsible tortfeasors. 75 Nonetheless, the
court reiterated that a retroactive application of the Proposition
could put plaintiffs in pending actions in a position worse than
plaintiffs whose actions accrued after the effective date of the Proposition. 76 Justice Arguelles reasoned that the statute of limitations
full recovery by
may have run on pending actions denying plaintiffs
77
preventing them from joining all tortfeasors.1
C. Minority Opinion
Justice Kaufman, writing for the minority, was joined by Justices
Eagleson and Anderson. 78 Justice Kaufman concurred with the ma-

received and the actual value of the property, while the amended version allowed the plaintiff
to recover the actual value the plaintiff paid and the actual value of what he received; Stout
v. Turney, 22 Cal. 3d 718, 586 P.2d 1228, 150 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1978) (also involving a revision
of Civil Code section 3343 which dealt with the measure of damages recoverable in a real
estate fraud action).
169. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1222-25, 753 P.2d at 608-10, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 651-54.
170. Id. at 1223-24, 753 P.2d at 608-09, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 652-53.
171. 40 Cal. 3d 870, 710 P.2d 309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1985).
172. See White, 40 Cal. 3d at 884, 710 P.2d at 316, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 516 (holding that
a statute would not be construed retrospectively, especially when it diminishes or extinguishes
a cause of action).
173. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1224, 753 P.2d at 609, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1215-16, 753 P.2d at 603, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
176. Id. at 1224-25, 753 P.2d at 609-10, 246 Cal.Rptr. at 653.
177. Id. at 1225, 753 P.2d at 609, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
178. Id. at 1242, 753 P.2d at 585, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 671 (Kaufman, J. concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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jority on the issue of the constitutionality of Proposition 51, but
concluded that the statute should be applied retroactively. 79 Justice
Kaufman felt the majority opinion utilized erroneous legal assumptions backed up by factually incorrect practical considerations.180
First, he argued that the court incorrectly assumed that absent an
express statement of legislative intent, Proposition 51 must be applied
prospectively.' 18 He argued that this "presumption of prospectivity"
82
controls only when no legislative intent can be ascertained.1
Applying the In re Marriageof Bouquet factors, 83 Justice Kaufman
concluded that the majority failed to consider the history of Proposition 51.184 This history revealed that governmental agencies and
private businesses could not afford the high insurance costs resulting
from increasingly common multi-million dollar tort judgments and
exposure to liability in percentages in excess of their proportion of
fault. 8 5 Considering this historical context, together with the explicit
declaration of Proposition 51 to remedy the inequity of liability in
proportion greater than the existence of fault, the dissent found an
86
implied intent to apply Proposition 51 retroactively.
The dissent pointed out that California courts apply statutes ret81 7
roactively when the legislation seeks to remedy an existing inequity.
The dissent held this principle applicable to civil as well as criminal
cases. 18' After concluding that a retroactive intent can be inferred

179. Id. at 1227, 753 P.2d at 617, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 661 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
180. Id. at 1228, 753 P.2d at 617, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 661 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
181. Id. (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182. Id. See In re Estrada, 63 Cal. 2d 740, 746, 408 P.2d 948, 951, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172,
176 (1965) (holding that the presumption of prospectivity applies only after examination of all
factors fails to reveal legislative intent). See also supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text
(discussing application of the factors by the majority).
183. See In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 587, 546 P.2d 1371, 1376, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 427, 432 (1976). Those factors included the context of the legislation, its objective, the
evils sought to be remedied, the history of the times and of legislation upon the same subject,
public policy, and contemporaneous construction. Id.
184. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1231, 753 P.2d 585, 619, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 663-64 (1988) (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185. Id. at 1231-32, 753 P.2d at 619-20, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 664 (Kaufman, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
186. Id. (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
187. Id. at 1233, 753 P.2d at 621, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 664-65 (Kaufman, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (referring to In re Estrada, 63 Cal. 2d 740, 408 P.2d 948, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 172 (1965)).
188. Id. at 1233, 753 P.2d at 621, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 665 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citing Abrams v. Stone, 154 Cal. App. 2d 33, 315 P.2d 453 (1957))
(statute is not made retroactive merely because it draws on facts before its enactment for
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from a remedial purpose, the dissent argued that the issue became
the justification of such an inference in the context of Proposition
51.119 To make this determination, Justice Kaufman found it necessary
to interpret the holding of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Ind. Acc.

Com. 190 He argued that the majority incorrrectly interpreted Aetna
as holding that retroactive intent cannot be inferred from remedial
purposes alone. 19' Justice Kaufman stated that the proper interpre-

tation of Aetna was that one rule of statutory construction could
not supercede another. 92 In addition, the dissent stated that the court
was capable of weighing probative evidence to determine whether
Proposition 51 was remedial in nature. 193 Justice Kaufman emphasized

that the measure was intended to alleviate a crisis, and thus, an
inference could be drawn justifing retroactive application of the
statute. 194
In addition, Justice Kaufman rejected two practical considerations

used by the majority to justify their decision. 195 The first of those
considerations involved concern over the possibility of an insurance
windfall resulting if the statute were applied retroactively. 96 Justice
Kaufman contended that the majority should decide retroactivity of
Proposition 51 with the same impartiality displayed in Li and Amer-

operation; to have retroactive effect it must give the previous transaction to which it relates
different legal effect from that which it had when it occurred). Accord Andrus v. Municipal
Court, 143 Cal. App. 3d 1041, 192 Cal. Rptr. 341 (1983) (an amendment which repealed the
statutory right for an appeal to the superior court challenging an extraordinary writ proceeding
in municipal court was meant to apply retroactively because "the obvious goal of the
amendment . .. suggest[ed] the logic of retroactive application"); Harrison v. Workman's
Comp. Appeals Bd., 44 Cal. App. 3d 197, 118 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1974) (holding that the intent
of an amendment to the Labor Code designed to remedy procedural delay and expense caused
by previous law would not be effectuated unless applied retrospectively as well as prospectively);
Coast Bank v. Holmes, 19 Cal. App. 3d 581, 97 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1971) (a statute does not
operate retroactively merely because some of the facts or conditions on which its application
depends existed before its enactment); City of Sausalito v. County of Marin, 12 Cal. App. 3d
550, 90 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1970) (curative statute which nullified judicial decisions overturning
local zoning proceedings for technical procedural omissions construed as applying retroactively
because the legislative purpose could be fully effectuated only by retroactive application).
189. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1233, 753 P.2d 585, 622, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 666 (1988) (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
190. Id. See also Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 30 Cal. 2d
388, 182 P.2d 159 (1947).
191. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1235, 753 P.2d at 622-23, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 666-67.
192. Id. at 1235, 753 P.2d at 622, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 666 (Kaufman J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
193. Id. at 1236, 753 P.2d at 623, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 667 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
194. Id. (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195. Id. (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
196. Id. at 1236-38, 753 P.2d at 623-24, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 667-68 (Kaufman, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).

1989 / Evangelatos v. Superior Court

ican Motorcycle. 97 He explained that before the court adopted comparative negligence, insurance companies calculated their rates based
on the ability of contributory negligence to act as a complete bar to
recovery by a plaintiff. 98 He noted that the court did not express
any concern over the greater sums that insurance companies had to
pay when the court opted for a limited retroactive application of
comparative negligence, even though the sums were neither anticipated nor compensable. 99 Thus, the dissenters found no logical
reason for being concerned with the prospect of a "windfall" for
insurance companies in this case.200
Second, the dissent found that the majority incorrectly concerned
itself with the reliance of the parties on pre-Proposition 51 law in
choosing whom to sue and how to settle. 201 The dissent argued that
no evidence existed which showed that plaintiffs previously declined
to sue potentially liable defendants in reliance on the ability to sue
other parties. 202 Therefore, no inference could be drawn that plaintiffs
took such action. 20 3 The dissent asserted that general experience
teaches that plaintiffs sue everyone who might be liable. 204 Even if
plaintiffs did not sue everyone, the dissent stated that it was unfair
to allow plaintiffs to take tactical advantage of an old rule that
allowed them to choose which defendants would pay for total economic and noneconomic damages when Proposition 51 intended to
20 5
remedy the very unfairness of such an advantage.
Finally, on the issue of settlement, the dissent found the majority
concern for plaintiff's settling for less than a reasonable sum illusory. 2°6 Justice Kaufman first indicated that good faith settlements
must reflect a reasonable range of the proportionate share of the

197. Id. at 1237, 753 P.2d at 623, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 667 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
198. Id. at 1236, 753 P.2d at 623, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 667 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
199. Id. at 1237, 753 P.2d at 623, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 667 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
200. Id. at 1237-38, 753 P.2d at 623, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 667 (Kaufman, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
201. Id. at 1238-39, 753 P.2d at 624-25, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 668 (Kaufman, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). See also note 143 and accompanying text (discussing the
majority's interpretation of the reliance issue).
202. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1238, 753 P.2d 585, 625, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 668 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
203. Id. (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204. Id. (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
205. Id. (Kaufman J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
206. Id. (Kaufman J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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settlor's liability. 2°7 The dissent acknowledged that plaintiffs might
settle for less than the proportionate share of liability of the defendant
in reliance on the "deep pocket" rule. 20 8 However, the dissent made
it clear that a settlement below the reasonable range of liability
should not be sanctioned by any trial court because of its unfairness

29
to other nonsettling defendants. 0

III.

LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS

Evangelatos effectively quashes future constitutional challenges to
Proposition 51 that are based on vagueness and equal protection

violations because of the unanimous decision on the constitutional
question. More important, Evangelatos provides firm guidance for
California courts in interpreting legislative enactments or voter measures that are silent on the issue of retroactivity. Under Evangelatos,
drafters of bills should expressly state a retroactive intent or the
court will not likley give it retroactive application. 210 Despite the
holding in Evangelatos, three of the Justices adamantly expressed

the view that Proposition 51 should be applied retroactively. 21' Since
the prospective operation of the statute has the potential to keep the

doctrine of joint and several liability alive for several years to come, 2 Evangelatos may not prevent the litigation of retroactivity from
arising in the future. For example, it remains unclear whether Proposition 51 applies to a victim injured over a prolonged period of
time comprising both pre and post-Proposition 51 law. Parties injured

207. Id. (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to the holding
in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates, 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 256 (1985)).
208. Id. at 1240, 753 P.2d at 625, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 669-70 (Kaufman, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
209. Id. (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
210. See id. at 1214, 753 P.2d at 602, 246 Cal. Rptr at 645. "The presumption of
prospectivity assures that reasonable reliance on current legal principles will not be defeated
in the absence of a clear indication of a legislative intent to override such reliance." Id.
211. See notes 180-209 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons why the dissent
believed the majority opinion was operating under incorrect assumptions).
212. For example, if an attorney negligently drafted a will before June 4, 1986, and the
testator dies in 1996, it is unclear whether the beneficiary's cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress falls under the pre- or post-Proposition 51 rules. See telephone
conversation with Steven Smith, counsel for defendant in Evangelatos, June 10, 1988 (notes
on file at the Pacific Law Journal). Mr. Smith states that he does not purport to know the
answer to the question posed. Although it may appear that Proposition 51 could not apply to
this situation since there is no liability to sever, the question appears to remain valid for
situations in which one attorney or firm has recommended the negligent party for the drafting.
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by exposure to certain chemicals, cigarettes, or radiation may not
become aware of their injuries for years. Asbestos victims, affected
more than any other class of plaintiffs by the decision in Evangelatos,
experienced no noticeable trauma and had no reason to believe during
their labors that they were subjecting themselves to any risks. 21
Evangelatosimpacts the legal community by permitting two distinct
case strategies to remain viable. First, for causes of action that
accrued prior to Proposition 51, plaintiffs still retain the option of
searching for at least "one deep" pocket defendant, bringing suit
against him alone, and allowing him to assert claims against potential
fellow tortfeasors for indemnity. 214 However, for causes of action
accruing after the effective date of Proposition 51, plaintiffs must
seek out all potential defendants in order to obtain full recovery of
non-economic damages. Consequently, in the latter situation, plaintiffs must assess the potential financial worth of defendants to
determine the value of a case. The "deep pocket" defendant is
eliminated since he is liable only for his proportionate share of

damages .215
Of course, Evangelatos does not solve all of the interpretation
problems of Proposition 51 .216 One of these problems is the interpretation of the application of the Proposition to any action based
on principles of comparative fault. 217 When the plaintiff is free from
fault, comparative fault may be inapplicable under the guiding principle announced in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. 2 18 Another problem in
interpreting Proposition 51 is whether it applies to negligence cases
only or to the area of strict products liability and intentional mis-

213. See Brief of Asbestos Victims of America and the White Lung Association as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Plaintiff and Petitioner Gregory Evangelatos, Evangelatos v. Superior
Court, No. C 373 428, at 6, 13 (on file at Pacific Law Journal). Almost all the records that
would prove which products were used and what the manufacturers knew and did have been
lost or destroyed. Id. at 6. Thus, in addition to proving causation, plaintiffs injured both
before and after June 4, 1986 must contend with whether Proposition 51 applies to their

injuries.
214. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 532 P.2d 1226,
146 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1978) (permitting one concurrent tortfeasor to seek indemnity from other
concurrent tortfeasors).
215. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West Supp. 1988).
216. See generally CAL. CEB PROGRAm BOOKLET, supra note 3 (discussing problems in
interpreting Proposition 51).
217. See CAL. CrV. CODE § 1431.2 (West Supp. 1988).
218. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). Li states that the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff should not bar recovery but diminish that recovery in proportion
to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering. Thus, the argument is that
comparative fault principles apply only where the plaintiff is at fault in some degree. Id. at
1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875. See also CAL. CEB PROGRAM BOOKLET, supra note 3, at 9.
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conduct cases as well. 219 This issue is unclear because Proposition 51
speaks in terms of comparative fault rather than the more limited
term "comparative negligence".

220

Additionally, courts will have to resolve questions regarding the
interpretation of Proposition 51 in the area of settlements. 22' For
example, in a situation where a plaintiff sues a negligent driver and
a government entity for injuries caused by a dangerous condition on
the highway, and plaintiff settles with the negligent driver for the

policy limit, it is unclear whether the case that proceeds to trial
against the public entity may be based on principles of comparative

fault. Another question posed in the area of settlement arises when
the plaintiff, who has been catastrophically injured, enters into a
good faith settlement with a tortfeasor for $100,000. A judgment is

subsequently awarded against remaining tortfeasors for an amount
greatly in excess of $100,000. The question is to what extent the
$100,000 settlement is attributable to economic as opposed to nonecgnomic damages.'
Finally, despite the court's holding in Evangelatos that Proposition
51 was rationally related to accomplishing the goal of alleviating the
"insurance crisis," the issue of whether Proposition 51 actually meets
that goal is still hotly contested. A current study, undertaken by

Alameda County Supervisor, Don Perata, attempts to ascertain
whether any liability relief for municipalities occurred after the
Proposition's passage. 223 Additionally, consultants to the Insurance

Services Office (ISO), the rate making arm of the insurance industry,
have conducted a study attempting to analyze the impact of tort law
restrictions with regard to alleviating the "insurance crisis.' '224 An

219.

See CAL. CEB PROGRAM BOOKLET, supra note 3, at 9.
220. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(a) (stating that in an action based on principles of
comparative fault, the liability of each defendant for non-economic damages shall be several
only).
221. See CAL. CEB PROGRAm BOOKLET, supra note 3, at 23-24.
222. Id.
223. Although only 16 of 58 states have responded, preliminary results show the following:
(1) In almost every instance, counties have gone self insured. Some counties which are self
insured stated that, although their insurance was not cancelled outright, they would have
received mid-term cancellations since their insurers dropped all public entity business; (2)
fourteen of 16 responding counties have experienced no relief due to the passage of Proposition
51 while the other two responding counties indicated some relief due to pyschological impact
on plaintiffs; (3)of nine major Alameda County based health clinics for whom insurance
data was available, premium rates increased 122 percent over 1985-86 rates; and (4) generally,
insurance companies received over five dollars in premiums for every one dollar paid in claims.
See ALAMEDA BOARD OF SuPERvisoRs, PRELIMINARY REPORT OF FINDINGS (June 4, 1987) (copy
on file at Pacific Law Journal).
224. See AcCESS TO JusTIcE, TnE NEW ISO STuDY: REsTRIcTIONS ON LEOAL RIGHTS
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analysis
have no
Justice's
in order

of the ISO study concluded that the tort law restrictions
impact upon insurance rates.2 25 Furthermore, the Access to
analysis concludes that victim's rights should not be "slashed"
226
to allow insurance companies to gain more profits.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Evangelatos, the California Supreme Court ruled that Proposition 51 was constitutional but declined to give it retroactive applicability. The court stated that the statute was not void for vagueness.
The court also found that Proposition 51 did not violate the equal
protection clauses of the state or federal constitutions, holding that
severing the liability of concurrent tortfeasors for non-economic
damages rationally relates to achieving a reduction of the effects of
the insurance crisis.
The majority gave Proposition 51 a prospective operation only.
The court stated that a presumption of prospectivity existed where a
proposition or legislation is silent as to retroactive intent. The presumption favoring prospectivity can be overcome by either an explicit
provision for retroactivity or by clear evidence indicating the electorate consciously considered the issue. The defendants failed to
prove either. The Evangelatos majority asserted that the prospective
operation of the statute will protect the reliance interest of plaintiffs
who can no longer join all potential tortfeasors because of the
expiration of the statute of limitations. It appears clear for the
present that the impact of Evangelatos will create two catagories of
plaintiffs separated by strategies in pre and post-Proposition 51
actions.
Karen A. Asplund

WORTHLESS 2 (June 1, 1988) (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal). The study was analyzed
by Access to Justice, a consumer group which states its goal as obtaining comprehensive,
honest, insurance reform.
225. Id. Specifically, in examining state restrictions on joint and several liability, including
Proposition 51, the study concluded that in only one out of six hypothetical scenarios,
Proposition 51 would have only a moderate effect. Id. at 4.
226. Id. at 5. According to Access to Justice, insurance companies profits rose by 604
percent in 1986. Id.

